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The 2008 financial crisis underlined that, on the one hand, the operation of the 
banking sector is highly procyclical and, on the other hand, household borrowers 
are unable to assess their long-term ability to repay realistically. The resultant 
excessive risk-taking and inadequate risk assessment by banks brought, in Hungary 
as well, substantial losses for banks and a high rate of distressed customers. Through 
the enforcement of debt cap rules, the MNB as a macroprudential authority has 
been limiting the recurrence of excessive household indebtedness in a preventive 
manner since 2015. Focusing on international practices and the results of Hungarian 
regulations in the first two and a half years, we reviewed the Hungarian experiences 
with regard to the debt cap rules. Although we can only draw preliminary 
conclusions due to the shortness of the period elapsed since the introduction of 
the debt cap rules, our analysis demonstrates that, in line with their calibration, 
Hungarian debt cap rules currently do not restrict sustainable lending processes, 
and contribute significantly to promoting a healthy lending structure by restraining 
excessively risky loans. 
Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) codes: E32, E58, G21, R31
Keywords: financial stability, housing market overheatedness, excessive lending, 
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1. Introduction
The 2008 financial crisis clearly showed that the banking sector operates in a highly 
procyclical manner. Owing to market frictions in the banking sector and to diverse 
risk perception levels, there may be excessive risk-taking among banks and their 
customers in certain periods, and if this gives rise to a financial crisis afterwards, 
risk acceptance becomes overly low. The operation of the banking sector tends 
to reinforce economic and financial cycles, and in doing so it may give rise to real 
Financial and Economic Review, Vol. 17 Issue 1., March 2018, pp. 34–61.
*  The views expressed in this paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the offical view 
of the Magyar Nemzeti Bank. 
Péter Fáykiss is a director at the Magyar Nemzeti Bank. E-mail: faykissp@mnb.hu
János Szakács is a head of department at the Magyar Nemzeti Bank. E-mail: szakacsj@mnb.hu
Márton Zsigó is an analyst at the Magyar Nemzeti Bank. E-mail: zsigoma@mnb.hu
Alexandr Palicz is an analyst at the Magyar Nemzeti Bank. E-mail: palicza@mnb.hu
The Hungarian manuscript was received on 25 September 2017.
DOI: http://doi.org/10.25201/FER.17.1.3461
35
Experiences of Debt Cap Regulations in Hungarian Retail Lending
economic losses; therefore, one of the primary tasks of macroprudential policy is 
to mitigate the procyclicality of the banking system. In addition, it became clear 
that household borrowers are not always capable on their own of realistically 
assessing their long-term debt servicing capacity in the changing macroeconomic 
environment; thus in order to ensure a level playing field, policy instruments may 
also have to be applied to curb excessive indebtedness. In spite of the fact that the 
period of the more intensive application of macroprudential tools is relatively short 
in many countries, several empirical studies have recently been published with the 
encouraging conclusion that a more active application of macroprudential policy 
may not only help mitigate the volatility of GDP growth, but ceteris paribus it may 
facilitate stronger growth in the long run too (see, for example, Boar et al. 2017). 
The potential adverse effects of excessive risk-taking are aptly demonstrated 
by the consequences of pre-crisis lending in Hungary. Excessive lending occurs 
when lending conditions are more relaxed than warranted by the actual credit 
risk of borrowers. In pre-crisis years, both the increase in outstanding borrowing 
and the proliferation of foreign currency loans in Hungary (Figure 1) indicate that 
the systemic acceleration in lending took place with excessive indebtedness on 
Figure 1
Denomination structure of household loans
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the customer side, and excessive risk-taking on the side of the banking sector. 
In addition, the risk expectations of market participants were too optimistic in 
general. Consequently, the number of customers facing payment problems rose to 
an alarming level after the outbreak of the crisis. As the number of non-performing 
loans rose dramatically, banks’ impairment losses became so substantial that they 
required a series of capital injections between 2008 and 2015. Provisioning reduced 
banks’ disposable capital with a parallel, dramatic decline in their willingness to 
take risks in view of the economic outlook, and consequently, a drastic fall in new 
loan disbursements. This acted as a brake on the already restrained consumption 
and investment during the crisis (Figure 2, Bauer et al. 2013).
By enforcing debt cap rules, the MNB as a macroprudential authority has been limiting 
the recurrence of excessive household indebtedness in a preventive manner since 
2015. The mandatory requirements formulated according to a comprehensive system 
of criteria are applicable at the transaction level; thus they can mitigate risks arising 
from excessive lending in a targeted manner and hence, strengthen financial stability. 
The primary objective of the limits set by the MNB is to ensure that outstanding 
borrowing grows in a healthy structure and in a sustainable manner, and to mitigate 
Figure 2
Downturn in household lending and consumption during the crisis in specific 
countries
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the risk of excessive credit outflows emerging in the event of a future overheating 
scenario. In view of the possible wide-ranging effects of the debt cap requirements, 
it is worth summing up the relevant experiences of the past period. 
Below, we first explore the relationship between household lending and a significant 
contributor to household indebtedness, real estate bubbles. We then examine the 
applicability of debt cap type requirements as macroprudential tools designed 
to mitigate the risks of excessive credit expansion, and the estimates of their 
effectiveness on international samples, before presenting an overview of the 
experiences of the debt cap rules adopted in European countries so far. Finally, 
we take account of the results of the first two and a half years of the Hungarian 
requirements, focusing on developments in domestic lending trends, the effects 
of the limits so far, and their possible side-effects. 
2. Excessive household indebtedness and asset price bubbles
Excessive household indebtedness may have particularly severe consequences if it is 
accompanied by a housing market bubble; in other words, a general, sustained, and 
often explosive overvaluation of housing prices. If the price adjustment that follows 
the overvaluation is accompanied by excessive indebtedness of the population, it 
may trigger a severe real economic recession, and a financial and banking crisis. 
Several studies confirm that economic recessions associated with house price busts 
following a real estate bubble fuelled by a credit boom tend to be deeper and 
potentially longer than recessions amplified by other types of financial imbalances 
(see, for example, Claessens et al. 2009; Crowe et al. 2013; Jordà et al. 2015).
Residential property accounts for a significant part of households’ assets, while 
household mortgage loans comprise a large portion of the banking sector’s assets. 
An en masse default of housing loans undermines banks’ profitability through 
impairment, which deteriorates the banking sector’s lending capacity due to banks’ 
declining capital levels. As a result of depreciating housing prices, households and – 
through decreasing collateral value – banks suffer significant losses on their assets, 
although this does not trigger an immediate effect in the case of households. 
Hungarian households may be particularly vulnerable to this effect, as home-
ownership is typically high among households, irrespective of income status (nearly 
86.3 per cent in 20161); in addition, residential property tends to be the only very 
dominant wealth component among low-income households (see Boldizsár et al. 
2016). Relying on loans for the financing of housing is a substantial commitment for 
most borrowers, which may tie up the portion of household income that is available 
for consumption or for saving over the long term, even after the depreciation of 
the home’s value (“debt overhang problem”) and, through the decline in collateral 
value, may confront borrowers with an even tighter liquidity constraint. 
1  For more detailed data, see: http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=ilc_lvho02&lang=en.
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Intensive housing loan outflows may exacerbate real estate market imbalances. 
Some real estate market mechanisms hamper the sustained maintenance and fast 
retracement of the equilibrium price even without the emergence of excessive 
credit outflows. Examples include problems arising from information asymmetry, 
relatively high transaction costs and the adjustment constraints of the supply side 
owing to the specificities of the construction industry and regulatory features. 
Housing market transactions, however, typically require substantial borrowing on 
the buyer’s side. The expansion of credit outflows paves the way for a heightened 
demand for real estate, which contributes to the appreciation of real estate prices. 
With the increase in household assets and collateral values, the appreciation may 
amplify credit outflows, which may be reflected in an upsurge in housing market 
demand and also in an increased utilisation of real estate collateral for consumer 
loans (see, for example, the ground gained by home equity loans before the crisis). 
As indicated by the summary shown in Table 1, the interaction between lending and 
real estate prices has been confirmed by literature in several cases, although the 
authors may arrive at slightly different conclusions with respect to the short and 
long-term direction of the interaction. The contribution of the construction sector 
and the second-round contribution to GDP may increase temporarily. However, if 
the amplification mechanism leads to an asset price and credit boom that proves 
to be unsustainable in the long run, the excessive expansion in the construction 
sector and the affiliated activities translate into a suboptimal allocation of resources, 
the negative legacy of which may cast a long shadow over the growth potential of 
the economy after the bursting of the bubble (see, for example, Borio et al. 2016). 
Table 1
Overview of literature on the interaction between housing prices and credit
 Long-term interaction Short-term interaction
Author
house 
prices i
credit
house 
prices h
credit
house 
prices o  
credit
house 
prices i  
credit
house 
prices h  
credit
house 
prices o  
credit
Hoffmann (2003) * *
Hoffmann (2004) *
Brissimis and Vlassopoulos (2009) * *
Gerlach and Peng (2005) * *
Oikarinen (2009a, 2009b) * *
Fitzpatrick and McQuinn (2007) * *
Berlinghieri (2010) * *
Gimeno and Martinez-Carrascal 
(2010) *
Note: Asterisks indicate the cases where the studies identified effects between house prices and credit.
Source: Anundsen – Jansen (2013)
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Empirical literature provides evidence that excessive household indebtedness 
increases the probability of real estate market imbalances and the evolution of 
severe financial crises. Some analyses distinguish between two types of asset 
price bubbles: processes fuelled by easy credit and those financed by stock market 
speculation (“irrational exuberance”) (Mishkin 2008). In the international sample 
of Crowe et al. (2013), real estate bubbles were accompanied by intensive credit 
outflows in the vast majority of cases. Cerutti et al. (2017) arrived at a similar 
conclusion: the authors found that only about one-fifth of the international 
house price booms were imbalances without excessive credit outflows. It should 
be mentioned that around sixty per cent of the real estate booms reviewed by 
the authors exhibited intensive credit outflows not only in mortgage credit but 
also among a broader range of household loans. Note that real estate market 
amplification mechanisms do not necessarily operate with the same strength 
in all asset markets. Schularick and Taylor (2012) identified credit growth as the 
most powerful predictor of financial crises; however, the authors did not find its 
interaction with stock price changes significant in increasing the probability of 
a financial crisis. Based on the literature, the aggregate debt service ratio is typically 
one of the most useful early warning macro variables of banking crises, along with 
the variables that capture credit outflow dynamics and levels somewhat earlier 
(Drehmann – Juselius 2014; Drehmann et al. 2017).
Although excessive credit outflows may lead to severe financial crises, lending that 
supports the real economy in a sustainable manner is an important factor at the 
level of the national economy. Using an international sample, Gorton and Ordoñez 
(2016) compared periods where the ratio of credit growth-to-GDP exceeded 
a certain level in every case, but some of these credit booms ended in financial 
crises, while others did not. All boom periods that ended without a crisis displayed 
– both in developed and emerging countries – more dynamic average economic and 
investment growth and an improvement in productivity (both in terms of labour 
and total factor productivity). Accordingly, in light of a series of other indicators and 
criteria it is imperative for macroprudential policy to be able to identify dynamic 
periods that are not adequately supported by fundamentals. 
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3. Debt cap rules as macroprudential instruments preventing 
excessive household indebtedness
3.1. Impact mechanism of debt cap rules
The two main types of debt cap rules are variables that limit the maximum credit 
amount available to borrowers and debtors’ maximum debt service costs. The 
loan-to-value ratio (LTV) defines the maximum credit amount in proportion to the 
market value of the underlying collateral. The second main group of debt cap type 
requirements regulates the loan-to-income ratio (LTI) and the payment-to-income 
ratio (PTI). The first rule sets the maximum credit amount available to the debtor 
in proportion to the debtor’s disposable income – which, in general, is steadily 
available to the debtor on an annual basis –, whereas the second limits the debtor’s 
maximum monthly debt service costs based on the debtor’s monthly income. 
Debt cap requirements are primarily intended to restrain excessive household 
lending. Besides households, this macroprudential instrument may be theoretically 
extended to corporate lending as well; however, due to the calibration difficulties 
this would entail, such application of the debt cap rules is uncommon. Indeed, there 
is no clear definition for corporations’ stable, disposable income and it is extremely 
difficult to determine the market value of the underlying collateral in their case. 
Collateral and income-based requirements may significantly restrain the cyclicality 
of real estate prices and household lending. The requirements affect both credit 
demand and credit supply. LTV limits primarily curb the maximum credit amount 
that can be granted by creditors in order to prevent potential losses from housing 
price corrections, while income-based requirements limit the maximum debt service 
that can be undertaken by debtors or the maximum credit amount available to 
them. Restrictions on both indicators collectively restrain excessive lending to 
households and encourage banks to compete through product pricing and the 
provision of extra services rather than through easing their lending conditions. 
Consequently, the regulations serve as targeted tools to reduce the systemic risks 
inherent in excessive household indebtedness and to support the sustainable 
provision of credit to the economy (ESRB 2014). 
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Table 2
Transmission of debt cap rules
 
Direct  
adjustment 
channels
Effects inside  
the banking  
sector
Effects outside 
the banking  
sector
Aggregate effects
LTV↓ 
PTI ↓
Regulatory 
arbitrage
Role of foreign 
credit may increase
Non-bank 
institutions may 
assume an 
increased role in 
lending
With the dampening 
of the credit cycle 
and the reduction of 
PD and LGD values 
the resilience of the 
banking sector 
increases, post-crisis 
downturns become 
less severe and the 
real economy 
recovers faster
Credit market
Credit demand  ↓
Credit supply ↓
Decreasing 
volatility in real 
estate pricesExpectations
Stricter risk 
management
PD↓ and LGD↓
Source: MNB (2016)
Debt cap rules improve the shock-resilience of creditors and debtors simultaneously, 
thereby mitigating the negative repercussions of a potential financial crisis. On 
the one hand, the loan-to-value requirement ensures that banks’ claims can be 
satisfied by disposing of the underlying collateral even in the case of a sharp 
decline in real estate prices; on the other hand, income-based requirements ensure 
some room for manoeuvre for debtors in the case of an increase in debt service 
or a decline in their income. In addition, debt cap rules should be calibrated in 
view of the current state of the financial cycle. Accordingly, the rules should be 
tightened in periods of excessive risk acceptance and eased in times of financial 
crises, although, owing to the smaller volatility of household incomes, income-based 
requirements may be more effective throughout the entire cycle than the loan-to-
value regulations (Szombati 2017). Moreover, since real estate prices increase faster 
than household incomes and savings when credit markets and real estate prices 
are highly overheated, maintaining the level of the loan-to-value ratio requirement 
will contain excessive lending in the housing market (ESRB 2014) in itself. At the 
same time, a countercyclical adjustment of the cap might become necessary to 
counteract the overheating more vigorously.
From a broader perspective – besides the macroprudential target system – the 
positive consumer protection effect of the debt cap rules should be assessed as 
well. In addition to their macroprudential significance, the debt cap rules also play 
a role in consumer protection, as they not only restrain excessive credit expansion in 
the household segment as a whole, but also protect each individual borrower from 
excessive indebtedness. The transaction-level requirement reduces the probability 
of social problems recurring that stem from defaulting debtors in the aftermath 
of the crisis.
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During the calibration of debt cap rules, the possibility of regulatory arbitrage should 
also be restricted. Nouy (2017) distinguishes between three types of regulatory 
arbitrage2. The first can be described as “cross-jurisdiction” arbitrage, which takes 
advantage of the differences in the regulations of individual countries. The second 
involves cross-sectoral business activities, while the third type of arbitrage is the 
exploitation of loopholes within the regulatory framework. The operation of the 
first two types in the case of debt cap rules is illustrated by Table 2. If the scope 
of debt cap rules is limited to domestic banks and institutions, when the limits 
are tightened, lending by domestic banks may be replaced by cross-border or 
branch office lending by non-resident institutions, or lending by non-bank financial 
enterprises and other institutions engaged in non-bank lending. The third type of 
regulatory arbitrage is discussed in detail in Chapter 5.3.
3.2. Effectiveness of debt cap requirements based on international experience
Based on the initial and relatively limited experience so far, debt cap rules effectively 
mitigate the risks associated with excessively fast credit outflows, and may also 
dampen the housing market price hikes fuelled by the credit expansion. Before the 
2007–2008 global crisis, the active, regulatory-level application of debt cap rules was 
not common. However, the application of this regulatory tool became increasingly 
popular during the years following the crisis worldwide, which, in addition to 
a growing awareness of the importance of macroprudential regulations, may also 
be motivated by current systemic problems arising in the low interest environment 
typical of developed economies (e.g. sharp rises in real estate prices often with 
strong regional heterogeneity). Estimating the effectiveness of the debt cap rules, 
however, is a challenging endeavour in view of the relatively short time that has 
elapsed since its introduction; moreover, lending activity continued to expand 
below the equilibrium level in several countries after the crisis, which restricts the 
applicability of any advanced measurement approach. On the other hand, by nature, 
the short-term costs of applying macroprudential policy may arise immediately, 
whereas its benefits (e.g. moderation of the significant negative impacts of a future 
crisis) will materialise much later and are more difficult to measure. 
Nevertheless, based on empirical experiences so far, debt cap rules have proved 
to be one of the most promising regulatory tools available (Table 3). Meanwhile, 
the results also demonstrated that beyond the diverging inspection methods, the 
effectiveness of various debt cap tools may vary across economies and periods with 
respect to their impact on specific regulatory outcome variables. 
2  Regulatory arbitrage refers to an adjustment in banks’ business conduct with a view to circumventing the 
impact of a regulation without a corresponding reduction in the underlying risk.
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Table 3
Studies investigating the effects of PTI and LTV rules
Studies conducted using international samples
Variable targeted 
by the regulation
Author(s) (geographical scope) [other details about the 
dependent variable]
PTI 
(& LTI) LTV
Housing or 
mortgage loan 
portfolio (growth) 
Kuttner and Shim 2013 (57 countries worldwide)
significant 
and material
not 
significant
McDonald 2015 (17 countries worldwide) significant significant
Akinci and Olmstead-Rumsey 2015 (57 countries 
worldwide)
significant 
and material
significant 
and material
Jácome and Mitra 2015 (5 East Asian and East European 
countries)
n.a. significant
Morgan et al. 2015 (10 countries in Asia) n.a. significant
Loans to the 
private sector 
(growth, real)
Lim et al. 2011 (49 countries worldwide) significant significant
Geršl and Jašová 2014 (11 countries in Central and 
Eastern Europe)
significant
Cerutti et al. 2017 (119 countries worldwide) significant significant
House price- 
growth 
Crowe et al. 2013 (21 countries worldwide) significant
not 
significant
Vandenbussche et al. 2015 (16 countries in the CEE and 
South-East European region)
not 
significant
not 
significant
Kuttner and Shim 2013 (57 countries worldwide)
not 
significant
significant
McDonald 2015 (17 countries worldwide) significant
Akinci and Olmstead-Rumsey 2015 (57 countries 
worldwide)
significant 
and material
significant 
and material
Cerutti et al. 2017 (119 countries worldwide)
not 
significant
not 
significant
Carreras et al. 2016 (19 OECD countries) significant significant
Review of individual countries
Delinquency ratio Baek et al. 2013 (South Korea) significant significant
Housing or 
mortgage loan 
portfolio 
Igan and Kang 2011 (South Korea) [household credit 
growth outside of metropolitan areas]
significant significant
Kim 2013 (South Korea) [quarterly growth] significant
significant 
and material
Lee 2013 (South Korea) [real level]
not 
significant
not 
significant
Price 2014 (New Zealand) [national growth, 
counterfactual estimate]
n.a. significant
Wong et al. 2014 (Hong Kong) [estimated supply and 
demand]
n.a. significant
Neagu et al. 2015 (Romania) [growth] significant
Kuncl 2016 (Canada) [level, and impact on residential 
investment]
n.a. significant
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Table 3
Studies investigating the effects of PTI and LTV rules
House price
Craig and Hua 2011 (Hong Kong) [quarterly growth] n.a.
significant 
and material
Igan and Kang 2011 (South Korea) [growth, 
metropolitan area]
not 
significant
significant
Kim 2013 (South Korea) [quarterly growth] significant
significant 
and material
Lee 2013 (South Korea) [real level]
not 
significant
not 
significant
Price 2014 (New Zealand) [annual growth, 
counterfactual estimate]
n.a. significant
Kronick 2015 (Canada) n.a.
not 
significant
Note: YELLOW cells indicate the significant effects identified by the studies; WHITE cells and ORANGE 
cells respectively indicate non-significant results and estimates where the quantitative effect of the 
simulated regulatory interventions relative to the rest of the regulatory interventions reviewed (e.g. 
capital instruments, fiscal instruments, etc.) was prominent. GREY cells indicate instrument(s) that were 
not included in the given study. Cells that are not split in the middle indicate studies where the effect of 
the two different instrument types was not inspected separately. 
Source: Fáykiss et al. (2017)
Unfortunately, owing to the limited experience, efforts to estimate the real 
economic costs and benefits of the regulation are fairly rare in international studies. 
Boar et al. (2017) used one of the largest samples in the literature to analyse the 
effect of macroprudential policies on the long-term volatility and growth rate of 
GDP. The authors do not distinguish between the various cyclical macroprudential 
instruments and accordingly, they use a single estimate to measure the effect of 
debt cap rules and, for example, the effect of capital buffers. They found that the 
application of cyclical macroprudential tools in general reduces long-term output 
volatility and does not even curb growth significantly; indeed, they might even 
boost output growth. However, the tools may be less effective in financially more 
developed economies compared to the average. 
4. Application of debt cap rules across Europe
The use of debt cap rules has become increasingly widespread across Europe as 
well. Central and Eastern European and Northern European Member States are 
more frequently present among the countries applying the rule, whereas this type 
of regulatory activity is negligible in the core countries of the euro area (MNB 
2016). As regards the calibration of individual national regulations, we should note 
that while the loan-to-value ratio (LTV) is set up identically in individual countries 
for the most part, two main indicator groups can be identified for factoring in the 
repayment capacity of debtors. One of them includes payment-to-income (PTI)3 
3  Also known as debt-service-to-income (DSTI).
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type ratios, which cap maximum monthly payments relative to the debtor’s income, 
while the second group comprises loan-to-income (LTI) indicators, which define 
the maximum credit amount available to debtors based on their annual income 
(Figure 3). 
Figure 3
Debt cap type requirements across the states of the European Economic Area
Only PTI regulation – recommendation
Only LTV regulation – recommendation
Only LTV regulation – legally binding
PTI and LTV regulation – recommendation
PTI and LTV regulation – legally binding
No PTI or LTV regulation is in force
Note: In the case of Romania and Latvia, the LTV regulation is mandatory, while the PTI limit is based on 
a recommendation. 
Source: MNB (2017b)
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The application of the limits in individual regions can be summed up as follows:
•  Central and Eastern European countries: Besides Hungary, Slovakia adopted 
mandatory LTV and PTI limits, while the rest of the countries in the region 
either issued recommendations (Czech Republic, Poland, Slovenia, Croatia) 
or adopted mandatory provisions with respect to the LTV limit only, and – in 
addition to the mandatory LTV regulation – address the PTI limits in the form of 
a recommendation (Romania). 
•  Northern countries: LTV regulations were adopted as a recommendation in 
Sweden and as a regulation in Denmark, Finland and Iceland. In Latvia, besides 
the mandatory LTV limit, the PTI limit was set as a recommendation, while Estonia 
and Lithuania apply mandatory PTI limits and Norway adopted mandatory LTV 
and LTI limits.
•  Southern countries: In these Member States, only Cyprus adopted mandatory 
PTI and LTV regulations, whereas Greece issued a recommendation with respect 
to the PTI limit only.
•  Other European countries: The Netherlands introduced mandatory LTV and PTI 
rules and Ireland applies binding LTI and LTV regulations, whereas the United 
Kingdom issued a non-mandatory recommendation regarding the maximum credit 
amount available to borrowers relative to their annual income.
Despite the ostensible proximity of the thresholds of debt caps introduced across 
the EU, their comparability is significantly hampered by the detailed rules applicable. 
For example, as regards the debt cap rules that remained a national matter, for the 
calculation of the payment-to-income ratio individual Member States define the 
debt service and income components differently (e.g. with regard to sustenance 
costs), and different rules are applied to the management of co-debtors and higher-
income debtors, the de minimis limits, and the inclusion of bullet loans and floating 
rate schemes. Instead of the PTI indicator, several Member States apply the LTI 
indicator, which limits the maximum credit amount in proportion to annual income. 
As regards the loan-to-value ratio, different provisions apply for the definition of 
the market value in several countries. Accordingly, requirements applicable to 
overstretched incomes and to the disposal of collateral are hard to compare at 
international level. Therefore, even though the levels shown in Table 4 are often 
close to one another, it is fairly difficult to determine the “tightness” of the given 
requirement based on the level of the regulatory limits.
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Table 4
Debt cap rules in Europe
Country PTI and LTI* LTV Note / Exceptions
CH - 90%
CY 80% 80% 
PTI: 65% for FX loans
LTV: for financing the primary permanent resident of the 
borrower, otherwise 70%
CZ
40% PTI,  
8 LTI
80% 
LTV: 15% of lending may be performed with a limit of 90%
DK - 95%
EE 50% 85%
LTI: for 80% of lending – if the interest rate is low, with 
stressed interest level
LTV: for 85% of lending, it can be 90% for loans supported 
by a state guarantee
FI - 90% LTV: 95% for first-time buyers
GR 30-40% -
HU 50% 80%
PTI: between 10% and 60%, differentiated according to 
income and currency
LTV: tighter for FX loans or new vehicle loans, up to 30%
IE 3,5  LTI 90%
LTI: for 80% of lending for first-time house buyers and for 
90% of lending for non-first-time buyers
LTV: for 85% of lending
IZ - 85% LTV: 90% for first-time house buyers
LT - 90% LTV: it can be 95% for loans supported by a state guarantee
LV 40% 85%
PTI: 5% of lending should be performed with a 60% limit, 
compliance with a 50% interest rate stress limit is also 
mandatory
MT - 70% 
LTV: for household mortgage loan exposures with a risk 
weight of 35%
NL - 100%
NO 5 LTI 85%
LTI: for 90–92% of lending, depending on region
LTV: for 90–92% of lending, depending on region, 70% for 
home equity lines of credit (HELOC) type products, the cap is 
60% for secondary homes in Oslo
PL 40%
80% for 
household loans, 
75% for 
commercial 
property loans
PTI: 50% for higher-income borrowers
LTV: 90%, but can be raised up to 80% if the part above 80% 
or 75% is collateralised or insured
RO -
85% for housing 
loans, 75% for 
consumer credit 
LTV: between 80% and 60% for FX loans depending on the 
currency and the hedging of the FX risk, 95% if the loan is 
backed by a state guarantee
SE - 85%
SI 50% 80%
PTI: 67% for higher-income borrowers but only a specific 
portion of the income can be included in the eased limit
SK 80% 80%
PTI: calculated with an interest shock of 2 percentage 
points, for floating interest rate loans, up to 1 LTI, 100%
LTV: 40% of lending may exceed it up to 100%, but max. 10% 
can be above 90% and, up to 1 LTI the LTV limit is also 100%
UK 4,5 LTI - LTI: for 85% of lending
Note:* If the limits above refer to LTI regulations, this is separately indicated; otherwise the % limits refer 
to PTI-type regulations. 
Source: ESRB (2017)
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Several differences can be identified with respect to the regulatory tools applied 
in individual countries:
•  Institutional scope: In the case of certain countries (such as the Netherlands 
and Hungary) the rule has a broad-based institutional scope, covering not only 
credit institutions but also non-bank creditors, which reduces the possibility of 
circumventing the regulation.
•  Eligible incomes: In addition to Hungarian regulations, it is only in Cyprus, Estonia 
and Slovakia that prudent certification is required for the validation of after-
tax incomes. In all other countries applying mandatory regulations, banks are 
permitted to define the range of eligible incomes.
•  Differentiation by risk dimensions: In an international comparison, LTV 
requirements differentiate according to denomination (Romania) or real estate 
value (Ireland), whereas a similar differentiation of PTI requirements is not applied 
apart from in Hungary.
In order to ensure that the requirements are targeted as specifically as possible, 
several EU Member States apply exceptions in the debt cap rules:
•  Allowances for specific borrower groups: To ease less risky borrower groups’ access 
to credit, some countries permit, to some extent, the disbursement of loans 
with LTV values in excess of the limit (the Czech Republic, Ireland and Slovakia). 
Countries with high real estate prices support young, first-time home buyers 
by applying preferential LTV requirements for example (e.g. Ireland, Iceland). 
Baltic States have also defined preferential LTV caps with respect to housing loans 
backed by a state guarantee with a view to facilitating home purchases for first-
time buyers.
•  Exceptions as a percentage of the total portfolio: Sometimes policymakers allow 
creditors to disburse loans, up to a certain percentage of the total disbursement, 
with PTI or LTI values in excess of the regulatory limit, if the borrowers’ 
outstanding repayment capacity can be certified (e.g. Estonia, Lithuania and the 
United Kingdom). 
5. Debt cap rules in Hungary
5.1. Operation of Hungarian debt cap rules
The MNB was among the first in Europe to adopt legally binding, comprehensive 
debt cap rules. Entering into force on 1 January 2015, the rules are intended to 
prevent the overstretching of debtors’ incomes and collateral values alike: the 
amount of new household loans may not exceed 80 per cent of the collateral value 
(loan-to-value ratio, LTV) and, as a general rule, the total debt service of borrowers 
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may not exceed 50 per cent of their regular, legal income (payment-to-income ratio, 
PTI). In order to offset the different risks, the Hungarian regulation is stricter for 
foreign currency loans and more relaxed for high-income borrowers4 (Table 5).
Table 5
Hungarian PTI and LTV requirements
HUF EUR Other 
currency
PTI
Under HUF 400,000 net monthly income 50% 25% 10%
Equal to or more than HUF 400,000 net monthly 
income
60% 30% 15%
LTV
Mortgage lending 80% 50% 35%
Car loans 75% 45% 30%
Source: MNB
In calibrating the debt cap rules, the current state of the financial cycle should also 
be considered. Requirements should be shaped countercyclically, in line with the 
changes in the cycle: while a period of overheatedness may warrant the application 
of tighter LTV and PTI limits to prevent excessive indebtedness, in times of crisis 
and at the bottom of the credit cycle where there is a risk of a credit crunch or the 
credit crunch has taken hold already, there is generally room for easing the existing 
tighter limits. The primary objective of the adoption of debt cap rules – in view of 
the existing state of the financial cycle – was to put a “brake” in place that can be 
“hit” later in order to prevent excessive credit outflows (Szombati 2017).
Hungarian debt cap rules were calibrated by covering a broad range of criteria, 
along the lines of various risk dimensions.
i.  The debt cap rules can be comprehensive both in terms of the affected credit 
products and the protection of market participants. Hungarian debt cap rules 
cover all credit products offered to households; their application is mandatory for 
all creditors and consequently, the possibility of circumventing them is limited. 
The rules protect creditors and borrowers simultaneously: in the case of the 
PTI limit, the primary objective is to mitigate the risks arising from customers’ 
excessive indebtedness, while the LTV cap is primarily intended to reduce 
potential losses from the collateralised loans disbursed by banks. 
ii.  The requirement mitigates the risks of indebtedness in foreign currency by way of 
tighter limits in the case of both regulatory tools. An exchange rate depreciation 
may substantially raise both the monthly instalment amounts and the principal 
4  For the justification of this provision see, for example, Balás et al. (2015).
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value in proportion to the collateral, which should be covered by an additional 
buffer included in the limits5. 
iii.  The calibration of the regulation should differentiate according to customers’ 
disposable income. Since the growth rate of consumption typically falls behind 
the growth rate of income (see Hosszú 2011 for example), a higher portion of 
the income can be allocated to debt servicing. The model calculations of Balás et 
al. (2015) performed on the data of a questionnaire-based survey also confirm 
that higher-income customers should enjoy more latitude in applying for a loan, 
as the same PTI levels might be too tight for higher-income customers, and too 
relaxed for low-income customers.
iv.  To facilitate prudent lending, only legal, certifiable income may be considered 
during the application of the debt cap rules. Since legal, certifiable income is 
deemed to be more stable than any other form of income, only these income 
components should be considered in PTI calculations. This requirement 
encourages households with an intention to borrow to report their incomes; 
therefore, in addition to facilitating responsible lending, another positive result 
of the MNB Decree is promoting the whitening of the economy. This, however, 
may exclude from the group of borrowers the segments that previously obtained 
credit from “grey” income, without certification.
5.2. Experiences so far with regard to application of debt cap rules in Hungary
A lending turnaround has recently taken place in the case of the household 
portfolio, while the dynamic acceleration of the disbursement of new household 
loans continued. Since the trough observed in the first quarter of 2013, the level 
of new disbursements has increased dynamically, reaching the values recorded in 
early 2006 by the first half of 2017. Housing loans exhibited the greatest growth in 
the past year and a half: by 2017 Q2 their disbursement grew to HUF 171 billion 
from the HUF 85 billion registered in early 2016. The disbursement of consumer 
credit more than doubled during the same period. This expansion was driven by the 
robust disbursement of personal loans and trade credit, while home equity loans 
continued to have a negligible share (Figure 4). 
5  During the calibration of the required buffer, VaR (Value at Risk) or ES (Expected Shortfall) analyses may prove 
to be useful. They can assist in defining a PTI limit that ensures the PTI value does not exceed the regulatory 
limit applicable to forint loans even in the event of an extreme exchange-rate shock.
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So far, the dynamic acceleration in lending has not entailed significant indebtedness 
of households, which is also confirmed at the macroeconomic level by the negative 
credit gaps6. Although borrowers appeared to be somewhat more overstretched 
in the past two and a half years as in the first half of 2017, one fifth of the loans 
were disbursed to more indebted customers with a PTI value of 40–60 per cent, this 
rate exceeds the figure observed in 2015 by only 5 percentage points. This year’s 
high real wage growth, however, may slacken or curb further growth. Accordingly, 
although the limits may be activated for more borrowers, they are still not visibly 
concentrated around the regulatory caps (Figure 5). At the same time, contrary 
to pre-crisis years, the risk associated with housing loans and consumer credit 
has become significantly lower owing to the adopted or tightened prudential 
requirements and to the increased risk aversion of market participants (typically 
forint denomination, significantly lower LTV levels, etc.). Therefore, the dynamic 
credit expansion supports the recurrence of equilibrium lending and for the time 
being, cannot be considered excessive.
6  In this regard, see, for example, MNB (2017b).
Figure 4
Gross credit disbursement by credit institutions in the household segment by 
product type
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At present, the upswing in housing loans does not threaten a build-up of systemic 
debt problems. Housing loans disbursed in the recent period are denominated in 
forints; their maturity just reached 16 years in the second half of 2017 compared 
to the 19–20 years observed before the crisis, their LTV values are significantly 
lower and individual transactions are not visibly concentrated in the proximity of 
PTI limits. The probability of future debt problems associated with housing market 
processes is reduced further by the fact the borrowing is linked to no more than half 
of all housing transactions (MNB 2017a). In addition, the encumbrance of the real 
estate collateral behind housing loans remains low, although it exhibits a slow up-
slope trend. Parallel to rising real estate prices7 and dynamically increasing housing 
loans, debtors are more likely to finance their real estate purchases from borrowing; 
therefore, loans granted with collateral encumbered by more than 70 per cent of 
the market value represent an increasing share in total housing loan disbursements. 
At the same time, the share of these loans is still far below the levels observed 
before the crisis (Figure 6). Therefore, the dynamic expansion in the housing loan 
portfolio over the past three years took place in a far more sustainable manner 
than in the pre-crisis period. 
7  For a more detailed analysis of housing market risks, see the Housing Market Reports of the MNB. 
Figure 5
Evolution of the distribution of newly disbursed loans according to PTI over time
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So far, the robust increase observed in real estate prices in Budapest has not 
resulted in the population’s excessive indebtedness. Although Budapest real estate 
prices rose by around 70 per cent compared to their end-2014 level over the past 
three and a half years, excessive indebtedness has failed to materialise so far among 
households. On the one hand, Budapest real estate prices remain in the vicinity of 
the level warranted by fundamentals8. On the other hand, no significant difference 
can be identified between the indebtedness processes of Budapest and countryside 
citizens, even with regard to the regional effectiveness of the debt cap rules. Despite 
the surge in real estate prices compared to disbursements outside of Budapest, the 
share of loans with an LTV value of over 70 per cent is only four percentage points 
lower and the volume of the contracts affected by both limits is only 1.5 percentage 
points higher in Budapest. Considering the higher income levels of the capital city, 
this confirms that excessive indebtedness cannot be observed for the time being. It 
should be noted that Table 3 also confirms that, according to experience, debt cap 
rules are primarily effective in mitigating excessive household indebtedness and 
8  For more detail, see the MNB’s Housing Market Reports: https://www.mnb.hu/en/publications/reports/
housing-market-report
Figure 6
Evolution of the distribution of newly disbursed housing loans according to LTV over time
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exert a more limited effect on housing market processes. Consequently, they can 
mainly dampen real estate price surges fuelled by excessive lending.
In accordance with the above, based on the distribution of mortgage loan 
transactions by PTI and LTV values, a higher level of concentration around the 
regulatory limits can be observed with respect to the LTV value (Figure 7). Of the 
debt cap requirements, however, the PTI requirement generated the larger portion 
of the estimated effect with respect to the loans restrained by it. Indeed, based 
on the distribution fits used for the purposes of the impact estimate, compared to 
PTI values the regulatory limits pertaining to LTV values required adjustment with 
respect to fewer borrowers (MNB 2017b).
5.3. Potential adverse effects of debt cap requirements
Although the effect of debt cap rules at the transaction level significantly curbs the 
possibility of regulatory arbitrage, depending on the specific formulation of the 
rules, debtors and creditors to some extent may also adjust to the requirements 
through channels not affecting credit outflows, which may predict the limits’ 
increasing effectiveness. Table 6 summarises these adjustment options.
As shown by the table, possible adverse effects may materialise principally in 
the case of rules that impose limitations in proportion to income, which may be 
Figure 7
Distribution of housing loans disbursed between 2016 Q1 and 2017 Q2 by PTI and 
LTV values
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partly attributed to the fact that LTV values can be calculated with less complex 
methods. Another reason is the fact that PTI rules are applicable to all disbursed 
loans, whereas the LTV limit poses a constraint only in mortgage lending. Nudging 
borrowers towards less regulated, non-bank intermediary channels may be 
relevant in the case of both requirement types. This is addressed appropriately 
by the Hungarian regulation as its scope is not limited to bank lending. Although 
the requirements do not pose a constraint for loan transactions between private 
individuals, the significant proliferation of these transactions via online platforms 
or personal relationships has not been observed in Hungary.
Table 6
Debtors’ potential adjustment options to the debt cap rules
PTI LTV
Borrowing through non-bank 
intermediaries
relevant but addressed by the 
regulation
relevant but addressed by the 
regulation
Maturity extension
relevant but currently not 
prevalent
not relevant
Selection of a shorter interest 
fixation period
relevant but currently not 
prevalent
not relevant
Selection of a currency with 
a more favourable interest rate
relevant but addressed by the 
regulation
relevant but addressed by the 
regulation
Unsecured borrowing not relevant
relevant but addressed by the 
regulation
Source: ESRB, MNB
Since the size of debtors’ monthly instalments is determined by the triumvirate 
of principal, interest and maturity, adjustment to the PTI requirement is possible, 
without changing the principal amount, by modifying the interest and the maturity:
•  Schemes with more favourable interest rates: Two typical methods involve the 
selection of loans with a shorter interest fixation period or a currency with 
a more favourable interest rate level. Owing to the recent negative experiences 
of FX lending both among creditors and borrowers, foreign currency loans are 
not typical in Hungary at present. The debt cap rules, in turn, restrict higher 
risks through tighter limits. Although the share of more indebted borrowers 
is somewhat greater in the case of floating rate schemes compared to loans 
with interest rates fixed for longer periods, the difference is immaterial, and 
adjustment through the length of the interest period is restricted, overall, to 
an extent corresponding to the difference between the interest rate levels. The 
benefit provided by shorter interest fixation periods is offset by the fact that, in 
the calculation of the PTI value, the instalment for loans with an interest fixation 
period of at least 5 years has been calculated with a preferential weight of 85 per 
cent since May 2016; therefore, the higher instalment amount associated with 
the same principal amount is not in conflict with the PTI limit.
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•  Longer maturity: The impact of a longer maturity on the instalment amount 
diminishes in line with the extension of the maturity, while it increases the total 
payable amount significantly. Since the adoption of the debt cap rules only 
housing loans have been affected by a modest increase, but this can mainly be 
attributed to the general surge in house prices and the resulting credit amount 
increase. 
One adverse effect of the LTV requirement could be an upswing in uncovered loans. 
If borrowers do not have sufficient savings, they could adjust to the own funds 
requirements demanded by the LTV rules by applying for uncovered loans. Although 
such borrowings may precede applications for housing loans in the case of collateral 
encumbered at a high rate, only a small fragment of debtors in the Hungarian credit 
market choose this form of adjustment to the LTV rules. In addition, this effect 
is also limited by the PTI requirements, as the maximum portion of the debtor’s 
income available for debt service is restrained. The effectiveness of the PTI limit is 
buttressed, in such cases, by the fact that the interest rates on uncovered loans are 
far higher, which renders this form of adjustment very costly.
6. Summary
With the adoption of the debt cap rules, a regulatory framework has been put 
in place that allows for quick and efficient responses to mitigate the risks arising 
from excessive household lending. At present, the requirements do not restrain 
lending considerably; they are expected to exert their impact in periods of excessive 
credit expansion. Data recorded in the recent period do not point to a significant 
concentration of debtors in the vicinity of the regulatory limits, and no noticeable 
adjustment has been identified so far on the part of consumers. Therefore, in line 
with its purpose, the regulation only restricts excessively risky loans, ensuring 
a healthy structure for the recovery of household lending in the aftermath of the 
crisis. 
Obviously, additional challenges may materialise in the future with respect to the 
trends in lending, which can be managed – after moderate fine-tuning – with the 
existing debt cap rules. On the one hand, asset price overheatedness may also 
emerge on a regional scale. Compared to the rest of the country, surges in real 
estate prices may prove to be stronger in some economically developed regions 
– typically around the capital city or major cities – due to greater demand for 
real estate and a more restricted supply. Numerous countries have adopted 
differentiated debt cap rules to dampen overheated regional real estate prices, 
but for the time being, trends in lending do not call for such differentiation in the 
case of Hungary. On the other hand, the high rate of floating rate schemes may also 
pose a challenge in the future. The instalment amount of floating rate loans follows 
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potential changes in the interest rate environment either instantaneously or with 
a small lag, and a strong increase in interest rates might prompt debtors to make 
drastic consumption adjustments. International regulatory practice offers several 
solutions to incorporate the interest rate risks associated with floating rate schemes 
into the debt cap rules. Great Britain and Romania issued a recommendation; the 
initial recommendation was replaced by mandatory regulations in 2015 in Norway 
and in March 2017 in Slovakia; loan assessments must assume cross-cycle interest 
rate levels in Estonia,9 while no more than one third of all disbursements can be 
floating rate schemes in Israel.10 Finally, the efficiency of debt cap requirements 
can be improved further by introducing a mandatory positive credit registry 
and by providing the conditions for voluntary, central income queries. To define 
the PTI value, creditors should be able to determine – clearly and in a credible 
manner – the existing debt service and income of debtors. Although various credit 
registries are available to estimate the debt-service burden, their efficiency can 
only be maximised if they include all loan contracts linked to a single debtor and 
if creditors can query the database even without the debtor’s consent. Another 
operative difficulty of PTI determination is the precise definition of eligible, stable 
and certifiable incomes. Indeed, some income types are far too periodical and their 
inclusion in the calculation may therefore be problematic; other income types might 
be too difficult to certify. One possible solution to this problem may be establishing 
a central database for income queries available to banks, subject to the debtors’ 
consent.
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